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ABSTRACT

This study discusses the potentials and constraints related to development planning in conflict-vulnerable areas in Southern Philippines. It reviews broad historical trends in the the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, focusing on government attempts at the turn of the century to the present day.

Peace agreements signed between the Philippine Government and various armed groups in 1976, 1996 and 2014 provide for intensified socio-economic reconstruction in the area, which has been plagued by identity- and resource-based conflict for more than five decades. However, successive administrations have largely treated development as secondary to political and security-sector goals. A historical review shows that government planning policy in Mindanao has tended to exacerbate conflict, where the dominant paradigms are extraction, co-optation, and counter-insurgency rather than a comprehensive human security-based approach. While there is a nascent practice of ‘conflict-sensitive and peace-promoting’ (CSPP) planning, particularly espoused by international actors, it tends to be limited by political timelines, and has yet to be mainstreamed into the Philippine planning system.

The study identifies key technical gaps in current CSPP practice: it must be more spatial, integrative, ecological, cultural, and localized. Specifically, the study highlights the recognition of culture and identity as well as geography and place as key components of context analysis for identity- and resource-driven subnational conflicts.

By discussing the planning and delivery mechanisms used by these programs, the paper explores broad implications to the peace dividends to be delivered under the March 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) or any arrangement to be reached by subsequent administrations—a discourse that is often overshadowed by the euphoria of achieving a landmark peace agreement.

Keywords: conflict topography, peacebuilding, socio-economic programs, post-conflict, reconstruction, Mindanao, Bangsamoro

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INTRODUCTION

Effective development planning entails the management and mitigation of multiple conflicts, in its various dimensions. This is especially crucial in the proposed Bangsamoro region in Southern Philippines, which has been plagued by identity-based armed conflict for more than four decades, and horizontal (inter-clan/inter-elite) conflicts for countless more. The majority of the 2,729 barangays (villages) of the proposed Bangsamoro—spanning the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)’s component provinces of Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi plus selected municipalities in Lanao del Norte and barangays in North Cotabato that voted to be included in the 2001 plebiscite—are plagued by some of the worst development indicators in the Philippines. ARMM's agriculture-based economy lags behind the Mindanao and national averages despite its rich natural and human resource base. ARMM also has the highest poverty incidence, where cyclical displacements due to armed violence as well as a historical investment gap between Mindanao and the rest of the country drive the inter-generational transmission of poverty.

A peace agreement signed in March 2014 after seventeen years of negotiations between the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the current largest armed group in the archipelago, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), is envisioned to pave the way for the just resolution of armed struggle in Mindanao and the gradual establishment of a new Bangsamoro regional government that shall replace the ARMM. Whilst the non-passage of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) during the Aquino Administration has left the peace process in a state of uncertainty, the provisions of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) as well as prior agreements in 1976 and 1996 with the MILF’s precursor, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), have created expectations for intensified delivery of socio-economic programs for rehabilitation, reconstruction and development—targeting both communities and combatants.

The shift of national leadership after the May 2016 elections provides an opportunity to address these issues at a fundamental level. Former Davao mayor Rodrigo Duterte will be the first Philippine president to hail from Mindanao, and has dealt with the major armed groups as a local chief executive. But while he has promised to ‘correct the historical injustice against the Moro’, Duterte’s early policy statements point to prioritizing transition to a federal system of government, instead of focusing on the Bangsamoro Basic Law (or an equivalent enabling law compliant to the CAB). Regardless of its political form, achieving durable peace will require renewed efforts to address the investment gap between Manila and Mindanao, as well as a fundamental transformation of previous governance arrangements, in a manner that respects local communities’ right for greater autonomy to chart their own political, cultural, and developmental destiny.

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1 ‘Bangsamoro’ is an autonym referring to the 13 Islamized tribes of the Philippines that have retained their socio-cultural and political identity in the face of colonization. These are the Badjao, Iranun, Jama Mapun, Kalagan, Kalibugan, Maguindanao, Palawanon, Mawanao, Molbog, Sama, Sangil, Tausug, and Yakan. The term ‘Bangsamoro’ is also the name of the proposed territory to be created under the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) signed between the Philippine Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Some groups do not fully accept the term as a point of identity, although the MILF’s precursor, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) first declared a secessionist ‘Bangsamoro Republik’ in April 1974.  
2 Coverage based on the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro. However, policy statements from the incoming Duterte Administration points to a revisiting of the 1976 GPH-MNLF Tripoli Agreement, which speaks of a vastly larger territorial coverage compared to the ARMM or the proposed CAB.  
Although any peace agreement is primarily political and security-related in nature, socio-economic development is recognized as a third aspect of the proposed Bangsamoro transition, along with the fourth interlocking pillar, transitional justice and reconciliation. However, socio-economic development for conflict areas has largely been treated as merely complementary (and therefore secondary) to political and security-sector goals.

A review of the experience of the ARMM and other countries further shows that when it comes to implementing peace agreements, it is not just a question of how much; it is also a question of how it is delivered. While both the MILF and the Philippine Government's development policy assert that development in conflict-vulnerable areas such as the Bangsamoro must be "conflict-sensitive and peace promoting", "context-specific" and "not business as usual", there is a distinct need to define and operationalize such as an assertion. For urban and regional planners working in these areas, what does "not business as usual" truly mean?

While there are discussions on "transformative" planning and programming, there are other specific post-agreement processes such as the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegation (DDR) of former combatants, or the MILF-specific process of normalization, and "post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation". Each would be complicated by the nature of subnational conflict, with its overlapping levels of contestation: in Mindanao horizontal conflicts (inter-elite and inter-communal conflict) mix with vertical conflict between Government and non-state armed groups (NSAGs).

As such, there is a need for more rigorous inquiry into the technical discipline of development planning for conflict-affected areas. Specifically, we examine the changing role of government socio-economic planning and development in the Bangsamoro peace process, with the premise that development in Mindanao cannot be understood without its interactions with the national and local political and security environment, and vice versa.

This review will focus purely on government policies and interventions, and not on international donor interventions. This is partly true due to data constraints, but also because local decisions and choices will largely determine if any true transformation can arise.

In the face of the 1991 Local Government Code and the devolution of frontline services to local governments, Imperial Manila's colonial relationship with the so-called "Land of Promise" has historically extended to economic policy and implementation. Planning in Midnanao and Sulu has consistently been fragmented and politically driven; "top-down" and not "bottom-up". As a result, development has not always brought peace. In many instances, it triggers and exacerbates the deeper causes of un-peace.

This article puts emphasis on four broad periods:

a. From 1913 to the 1960s, covering Manila's early attempts to politically and economically integrate Mindanao into the national body politic;

b. The Marcos era, where Martial Law saw the full-blown use of development as a tool of accommodation, co-optation, and counter-insurgency;

c. The creation of ARMM in 1990 and its (failed) attempts towards meaningful self-development and self governance under the Aquino, Ramos, Estrada, and Arroyo administrations; and
d. Development efforts under the present Aquino administration, which may or may not successfully begin the shift towards "normalization".

It must be noted that the 2015 Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC)'s recently-released sub-report on marginalization through land dispossession comprehensively details how assimilationist policies since the 1898 Treaty of Paris, ranging from resettlement, corporatization and militarization, have suppressed Moro and indigenous peoples' property rights and agency to decide on the development of their ancestral lands (TJRC 2015, WB-IOM 2015). This paper complements that stream of work by focusing on government policy trends, with some discussion of the contemporary role of official development assistance (ODA).

EARLY YEARS (1913 – 1960s)

As the US Army-run Moro Province gave way to the civilian Department of Mindanao and Sulu in 1913, the inchoate Philippine nation-state began its formal attempts to expand its influence over and subsume Moroland. This 1938 quote from Eulogio Rodriguez Sr, Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce under President Quezon, captures the dominant expansionist worldview shared by many Manila policymakers:

"My idea of the economic development in Mindanao is to populate it as rapidly as we can and to produce wealth out of its rich virgin soil, not only for the purpose of meeting the immediate needs of the settlers there, but also for the purpose of making the boon of that development available to all of us in general in the near future and when we are completely independent. The immediate results of this type of Mindanao development would be: (1) self-sufficiency for the entire Philippines; (2) exploitation of the other natural resources of Mindanao; and (3) an entirely new group of Filipino population made up of aggrupation from different sections of the country--law-abiding, industrious, and contented". (Rodriguez 1938, Emphasis added)

This paradigm would be applied on two fronts: economic, and socio-cultural. Government sought the hasty exploitation of large tracts of fertile land to supply food and cheap raw materials to Luzon and Visayas. Homesteading policies purportedly sought to show how Christian homestead seekers and the non-Christian communities of Mindanao and Sulu could live together in peace and harmony. As shown by Rodriguez's statement, however, it bordered on an attempt to socially engineer Mindanao by thinning out the insurgent Moro with an influx of settler blood.

In 1913, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2254, providing for the establishment of "agricultural colonies", first of which was founded in 1914 in Pikit, North Cotabato. The foundations of this policy were set twelve years ago by the Americans through Land Registration Act No. 496, which ensured that the application for registration of land titles shall be in writing, signed and sworn to by the applicant--immediately putting the local peoples at a disadvantage, and allowing other people to regard Mindanao as a frontier for the entire country. According to Muslim and Guiam (1999), by 1912 there were 159 major plantations (spanning 100 hectares or more) in Mindanao. 66 of the 159 were owned by Americans, 39 by Filipinos (mostly Christians), 27 by Europeans, and 27 by Chinese.

Christian migrants were entitled to larger tracts of land, approximately 16 hectares compared to native inhabitants' 10 or 8 hectares. This was quickly followed by CA 2280 in 1914, which
created the Momungan (Balo-i) agricultural colony, CA 2206 in 1919, authorizing provincial boards to manage colonies, and then a spate of resettlement projects from 1913-1930 under the Inter-island Migration Division of the Bureau of Labor. (LGSPA 2009)

One of the final laws passed before the creation of the Commonwealth in 1935 was Act No. 4197, the 1935 Quirino-Recto Colonization Act, which was the organic charter of the organized land settlement work to come. An aggressive resettlement campaign was launched during the term of Manuel Roxas using the slogan "Mindanao is the Land of Promise". This was supported by CA No. 141, which dictated that Moro ancestral landholdings not previously authorized by Spanish or American authorities were automatically considered public domain. At least four major colonization programs would be implemented until the early 1960's:

1. The pre-war (1939) National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA), which covered Koronadal and Allah Valleys in Old Cotabato province;
2. Land Settlement and Development Corporation (LASEDECO) in 1950;
3. Resettlement of former Hukbalahap insurgents under the army-run Economic Development Corporation (EDCOR); and
4. The National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) program, which was aligned with the so-called "Operation Central Luzon", which tried to ease agrarian unrest through land distribution and other socioeconomic measures. NARRA would run from 1954 until 1964, when it was replaced by the Land Authority Administration (LRA).

A review of these government resettlement programs shows the changing face of Mindanao for non-Mindanawons: as the promised land for settlers and pioneers; a new beginning for amnestied dissidents, and later, the major source of food and timber for the country. As noted by Licaros, however, "rural development, in particular, was not meant to break up landed estates, but rather to maintain the haciendas through the diversion of landless peasants to newly opened public lands." (Licaros 1959, 8)

Antonio Isidro, the first president of the Mindanao State University, drew comparisons between the handling of the Moro problem and Hukbalahap problem, noting how the approach to national and social problems has been "curative rather than preventive". "So it has always been," he wrote. "Crises first rather than remedy." (Isidro 1966) However, these stopgap measures were at the expense of Mindanao, and created greater problems in the long run.

Land issues were exacerbated by discriminatory economic policies. In 1969, Manila would receive 46.95% of the total government budget, while rural Mindanao received less than 10%--a trend that would continue until recent years. Philippine customs and tariff laws and maritime cabotage restrictions effectively declared centuries of free trade as illegal. Import substitution from the 1900s to the 1970s in support of manufacturing in Luzon and the Visayas kept the exchange rate overvalued. Together with high effective protection and tax rates on agriculture, this significantly eroded the competitiveness of Mindanao's agriculture exports.

The 1954 Kamlon rebellion in Sulu would push an independent Philippine Congress to create a special committee to investigate the "Moro Problem". This resulted into a series of initiatives that sought to culturally and politically integrate the "Moro and pagan tribes", which were lumped into labels such as "national cultural minorities", "non-Christian Filipinos", "cultural communities" (as described in the 1973 Constitution), before later being disaggregated into "indigenous cultural communities", "indigenous peoples", and "Muslim Filipinos" from 1987 onwards. These initiatives included:
1. The Commission on National Integration (CNI), which was created in 1957 through Republic Act No. 1888 for the purpose of achieving the national policy “to foster, accelerate and accomplish by all adequate means and in a systematic, rapid and complete manner the moral, material, economic, social and political advancement of the non-Christian Filipinos, hereinafter called national cultural minorities, and to render real, complete and permanent the integration of all the said National Cultural Minorities into the body politic.” While it is argued that the CNI funds were largely misused, it instituted scholarships that allowed future Bangsamoro leaders such as Nur Misuari and Mohagher Iqbal to be educated in Manila. The Mindanao State University was created under RA 1387 four years later, in 1961.

2. The CNI was abolished in 1975 with the creation of the Southern Philippines Development Authority (SPDA) through Presidential Decrees No. 690, 719 and 1703 as the agency responsible for the "initiation and/or implementation of development projects in Southern Philippines". Its board was later chaired by the Minister of Human Settlements, Imelda Marcos.

3. Office of the Presidential Assistant on National Minorities (PANAMIN), created through PD No. 1414 in 1978. This addressed all non-Muslim minorities, complementary to the work of the Ministry of Muslim Affairs (MMA). The MMA was established in 1981 through EO 697 and was renamed as the Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) soon thereafter.

4. Upon the PANAMIN Secretary Manuel Elizalde Jr's fleeing to the US shortly before the fall of the dictatorship, the powers of PANAMIN and OMA were merged into Office for Muslim Affairs and Cultural Communities (OMACC) in 1984. While Executive Order No. 969 claimed that "it is desirable to combine those agencies engaged in allied and complementary operations and activities relative to the development of the cultural communities in order to achieve better coordination, increased effectiveness, and unanimity of purpose in terms of ultimate results", the lumping together of Moro and lumad issues soon proved to be inefficient.

5. Upon Corazon Aquino's assumption of office, the OMACC was replaced by three bodies under the Office of the President: the Office for the Muslim Affairs (OMA) created through E.O. No. 122-A; the Office for Northern Cultural Communities (ONCC) created through E.O. 122-B; and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC), created by E.O. 122-C.

6. OMA was abolished in 2008 with the creation of the National Commission on Muslim Filipinos (NCMF). The powers and functions of the ONCC and OSCC were merged as organic offices of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), which was created through RA 8731, or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997. However, the Office for Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC) remains active as a devolved agency of the ARMM, although it functionally overlaps with NCMF and NCIP.

Despite these initiatives, which range from the genuinely transformative to the politically co-optive, deep-seated mistrust and discrimination sown during the colonial era would remain during Martial Law and beyond.

**MARCOS ERA (1965 – 1986)**

While a Mindanao Development Authority (MDA) was created as early as 1961 during the Macapagal period, it was more than a decade before it was activated. It had no office, the board of directors was never constituted, and its budget never fully disbursed. Once it received
its first budget allocation in 1964, it quickly became an instrument for patronage and patrimonial control (Abinales 2000 117-8). The objectives of the MDA were "to foster the accelerated and balanced growth of the Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan region...within the context of national plans and policies...social and economic development, through the leadership, guidance and support of the government." (RA 3034) By the time it was closed in 1975, it had created at least seven commercially operating agro-industrial projects, and drafted two Five Year Economic Plans for the periods 1966-1979 and 70-71 to 74-75, which largely aligned with the 1963 survey of the Senate Committee on National minorities, which identified five key problems: land, education, livelihood, health, and transport.

Despite the fact that the MDA's outputs were paper documents rather than true operational plans, they retained the same exploitative bent established in the early part of the century. The 1971 Strategy for Development for the Mindanao Region, prepared by the Presidential Economic Staff, was one of the first documents to directly mention growing social unrest on the ground as a parameter for planning:

"The case for Mindanao as an area for regional planning had long existed even before it was established. [...] The consequences of a sluggish planning effort in the past have started to show. In fact they are so evident today that the urgency of a more sincere and of a more relevant planning work cannot be underscored. [...] Impatience is written all over the faces of our fellow countrymen from Mindanao. Every single gunshot that has been fired has been an outcry that every moment counts--to the Moslem, to the Christian and to the Pagan alike--for Mindanao to grow faster, to develop more rapidly, to prosper more efficiently."

Contemporary accounts of the Moro rebellion almost always begin with the Jabidah Massacre. In 1658, the Sultan of Brunei ceded Sabah to the Sultan of Sulu in exchange for assistance in a bloody civil war. The Sultanate of Sulu claimed that they had only leased Sabah to the British, while Malaysia, who remains to pay a mere 70,000 pesos per year to Jamalul Kiram and his descendants, maintains that it was ceded, and its inhabitants had voted to join the Malaysian federation in 1963 anyway. All this led to the shadowy Oplan Merdeka, Marcos's covert plan to slip Muslim Filipino commandos in Sabah and sow rebellion. It is said that the special commando unit (code-named Jabidah) protested the bad training conditions in Corregidor and demanded to return home. At least to 28 (others say 64) were then summarily killed by their military trainers on March 18, 1968. At least one survived.

Outrage over Jabidah would set into motion a multitude of events--among them, the initiation of the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization (BLMO) by Datu Rashid Lucman. The BMLO sought for the creation of a independent state covering Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan (MinSuPala), a government for Moros by Moros. Similar to its precursors the Muslim (later, Mindanao) Independence Movement (MIM), Union of Islamic Forces and Organization (UIFO), and Anwar El Islam, the BMLO was initially headed largely by the traditional Moro aristocracy. But this, too, would change. The BMLO would eventually send young mujahideen for training in Malaysia, who along with equally supportive Islamic countries such as Libya would provide support to the BMLO and its offshoot, the MNLF. Arms and supplies would flow freely through the porous south. With the beginning of Martial Law in 1972, Jabidah was only one of the many reasons why a young man or woman in the countryside would choose to pick up a gun.
As war drove hundreds of thousands to makeshift shelters by the roadside, Marcos created the Presidential Task Force on the Reconstruction and Development of Mindanao (PTF-RadMin) in April 1973, in recognition that "the national goal for the development of Mindanao has been set back and mere government military operations to subdue lawless elements is obviously not adequate for the restoration of peace and order and the promotion of economic development in the area".

Its primary tasks included: (i) Immediate assessment of the damage wrought on private property and government facilities, services and establishments; (ii) preparation of an integrated plan necessary for the full reconstruction and rehabilitation of Mindanao; and (iii) restoration of peace and order by adequate military operations, apprehension of rebellious leaders and followers, and the implementation of a selective amnesty and rehabilitation program. (EO No. 411)

As a result, the PTF-RadMin launched the Reconstruction and Development Program (RAD) for Muslim Mindanao in early 1974, with the following goals:

1. Create opportunities by fully developing the region's potential;
2. Ensure that the masses share in the fruits of development;
3. Create conditions for closer national integration; and
4. Bring lasting peace to Muslim Mindanao.

A budget of PHP 406 million was set aside for implementation of the RAD Program, in addition to PHP 216 million for infrastructure, and PHP 96 million for electrification. At least 30 presidential acts aimed towards confidence-building were passed under the PTF-RadMin in support of the RAD program, among them:

- The Special Program of Assistance for the Rehabilitation of Evacuees (SPARE), created through Letter of Instruction No. 30. SPARE focused on creating a "human resource base with the skills and attitudes necessary for effecting socio-economic changes inherent in development", and "moulding Muslims and non-Muslims into one Filipino nation."
- PD No. 93, setting guidelines for liberalizing traditional trade for the Sulu Archipelago and adjacent areas, enacted on January 9, 1973.
- PD 291, instituting a national policy of recognizing and enforcing Philippine Muslim holidays, enacted on September 12, 1973
- PD 1217 and Letter of Instruction No. 142, providing for the creation of Maharlika Village in Bicutan, Taguig, Rizal in 1973
- PD 342, providing for the establishment of the University of the Philippines Institute of Islamic Studies in 1973
- PD No. 264, creating the Philippine Al-Amanah Bank on Aug 2, 1973. PD 264 allowed for a PHP 100 million capitalization, although it was only in 1989 when its charter as an Islamic bank was passed by Congress
- PD No. 410, declaring ancestral lands occupied and cultivated by national cultural communities as alienable and disposable, and for other purposes. Enacted on March 11, 1974, this purportedly meant to help address land conflict in Mindanao.

The war in Mindanao was not the only insurgency faced by the Marcos regime. Elsewhere, a parallel war raged between the Philippine Government and the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army/National Democratic Front (CPP/NPA/NDF). Due to various
ideological differences, the CPP/NPA splintered into other groups such as the Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army or CPLA; the Rebolusyonaryo Partido Manggagawa ng Pilipinas/Revolutionary Proletariat Army/Alex Boncayao Brigade or RPMP/RPA/ABB; and the Rebolusyonaryo Partido Manggagawa ng Mindanao or RPMM.

Marcos’s style of patronage politics also accelerated the systematic corruption of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, breaking its dignity and processes. This lead disgruntled young officers towards "military adventurism", with groups such as the Rebolusyonaryo Alyansa Makabansa/Soldiers of the Filipino People/Young Officers Union (RAM/SFP/YOU) to stage coup attempt after coup attempt in the years to come.

By 1975, it was a stalemate. Government would not budge, and the MNLF could not be subjugated despite the army's best efforts. A 1980 report to the Permanent People's Tribunal in Antwerp reported that by 1976, 50,000 Muslims were killed, 200,000 homes burned, 2 million internal refugees created, 535 mosques and 200 school buildings destroyed, and 35 towns and cities razed.

Negotiations led to the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, as brokered by Libya and the Organization of Islamic Countries. In exchange for peace, the Government promised that a Muslim Autonomous Zone would be created, comprised of thirteen provinces and 11 cities. Per the Agreement, the AFP would withdraw from the Zone, it said, and an autonomous security force would be created outside the AFP framework.

Marcos had no intentions of fulfilling the Agreement. Tripoli collapsed within six months. The result of a fact-finding study was that Marcos had only signed the agreement to gain time in order to prepare for an overall action against the Muslims in the South. Nevertheless, Tripoli was "implemented" unilaterally from 1977 onwards by the Marcos Regime through Proclamation No. 1628, declaring autonomy in Southern Philippines by providing additional powers to Central and Western Mindanao (Region XII and IX).

Development initiatives continued through the Southern Philippines Development Authority (SPDA), which by 1975 consolidated the functions and powers of the Commission on National Integration (CNI), the Mindanao Development Authority (MDA), the Presidential Committee for the Rehabilitation and Development of Southern Philippines (PCRDSP), the Presidential Task Force for the Rehabilitation and Development of Mindanao (PTF-RadMin), and the Special Program of Assistance for the Rehabilitation of Evacuees (SPARE). SPDA was mandated to undertake the following large-scale peace and developmental projects in conflict-affected areas of Mindanao, particularly, through Presidential Proclamations 2046 and Letter of Instructions 1061 and 1127 issued in 1980, 1981, and 1982.

Key terms used in planning documents during this period were "the attainment of peace and order", "acceleration of socio-economic development", "resettlement of displaced persons and families", and "generation of livelihood for MNLF Balik-kapatid", the latter being former rebels "returning to the fold of the law". The declaration of the split of the MILF from the MNLF came in March 1984.

UN advisor Paul Oquist (2002) notes that the Philippine approaches to ideology-motivated armed conflicts have fallen under three types: (PDHR 2005:33)

1. The "military-victory" position, or a purely military approach that is usually undertaken at the beginning of conflict, during stalemates, or periods of frustration with other approaches.
Vulnerable to manipulation of various interests, this is the predominant approach used during the Marcos regime, and during the Estrada "all-out-war" of 2000.

2. The "pacification and mobilization" position, which aims for cessation of hostilities and demobilization of forces, culminating in peace agreement. While not as hard as the military-focused position, the applied use of force is used to "soften" the non-state armed group, coupled with various methods of pacification, integration, and co-optation. The deeper roots of conflict remain unaddressed, leading to the intergenerational creation of splinters of splinters, from the Huks to the CPP/NPA/NDF, from the MNLF to the MILF to the ASG and BIFF.

3. The institutional peace-building position, which uses a comprehensive human security framework with the goal of "adoption and implementation of policies necessary to achieve sustainable long-term development." The current Aquino administration has institutionalized this in their planning documents, towards "Just and lasting peace, and the rule of law".

Vitug and Gloria note that Marcos "played games with the MNLF. He bribed its leaders when he could and appeased its members with livelihood projects, but most of the time he unleashed the strength of the Armed Forces to crush the rebellion". (Vitug and Gloria p 76) From time to time, this would be softened with visionary confidence-building measures, such as the enactment of the Philippine Code of Muslim Personal Laws in 1977. Until the end of his regime in 1986, Marcos would continue to co-opt MNLF commanders, lavishing local government posts, cash, firearms, ammunition, amnesty, immunity, import licenses; capitalizing on cracks that had always been there from the beginning.

AQUINO ADMINISTRATION (1986 – 1992)

Seven months after she became president, Corazon Aquino flew to Maimbung, Sulu to restart talks with MNLF. However, as Gloria and Vitug remark, Mrs. Aquino had neither the luxury of time nor the comprehensive grasp of the Mindanao problem needed to pursue to process. Excluded from the talks, the MILF staged a full-scale five-day tactical offensive in Maguindanao, North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Lanao del Sur and Lanao del Norte on January 13-17, 1987 to get the government's attention. Military installations, equipment and personnel were attacked and suffered heavy losses and damage. Peace talks with the MILF soon started thereafter. (Danguilan-Gloria and Vitug 2000, McKenna 1998).

The desire for social justice and genuine social change underpins the framing of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera, "geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures" (Art. 10, Section 15). Coming from decades of armed conflict, the drafting was informed by the fact that deep-seated injustice and denial of identity led to armed movements such as the MNLF, MILF, and their Northern counterparts the Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army (CPLA).

Aquino also oversaw the creation of the National Reconciliation and Development Program (NRDP) in 1986, which sought to coax so-called former rebels (FRs) or rebel returnees (RRs) out of the hills and back into mainstream society by facilitating immediate assistance or livelihood and countryside development in general. This included several sub-programs such as an offer of amnesty; the Balik-BARIL (Bring A Rifle and Improve your Livelihood) weapons buy-back scheme; the grant of emergency assistance including Balik-Probinsya, or means to return to one's point of origin without reprisal; and the provision of capacity-building, livelihood,
and resettlement assistance packages. Although the program was started in 1986, it was only two years later that the program gained traction, partially attributed to the 1987 creation of the regional, provincial, and municipal Peace and Order Councils (POCs) through EO No. 309.

While these programs largely targeted members of the CPP/NPA/NDF, the NRDP was highly active in Bangsamoro areas. At least 12,976 fighters from Muslim Mindanao availed of the NRDP from 1987 to 1991, in contrast to a total of 1,813 RRs from the New People's Army (NPA), 837 from the Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA), 1,845 "subversive mass activists" and 4,655 "NPA sympathizers". (Presidential Management Staff 1992).

Table 1 below summarizes the various reintegration programs implemented by the Philippine government from 1986 onwards. While the NRDP would evolve into various programs, Balik-BARIL would remain a constant feature. This became particularly relevant in the wake of the 1996 GPH-MNLF Final Peace Agreement, where there was no clear disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) component. Instead former MNLF rebels were integrated into the military or the Philippine National Police. Meanwhile, those who were not qualified or were unable to avail of integration into the security forces were processed through Balik-BARIL and various socio-economic development programs.

Table 1. Philippine Reintegration Programs, 1986-present

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<th>Program</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Implementing Agency</th>
<th>Enabling Law</th>
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<td>National Reconciliation and Development Program (NRDP)</td>
<td>1986-1992</td>
<td>National Reconciliation and Development Council</td>
<td>EO No. 103 s. 1986</td>
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<tr>
<td>Balik-BARIL (Bring A Rifle and Improve your Livelihood)</td>
<td>1987-2009</td>
<td>Department of National Defense - Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
<td>EO 103 (s. 1987 NRDP)</td>
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<td>EO 152 (NPUD)</td>
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<td>EO 3 s. 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The New NRDP</td>
<td>1992-1993</td>
<td>DILG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EO 211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expanded NPUD Balik-Loob Program</td>
<td>2000-2005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Integration Program (SIP)</td>
<td>2007-2010</td>
<td>National Committee on Social Integration (NCSI), OPAPP</td>
<td>AO No. 172 s. 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Proclamation No. 1377, series 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIP Closure Program</td>
<td>2011-2012</td>
<td>OPAPP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive Local Integration Program (CLIP)</td>
<td>2013-2015</td>
<td>OPAPP, DILG, LGUs</td>
<td>EO No.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ARMM was established in 1989 by virtue of Republic Act No. 6734. Four of eighteen provinces agreed to join the autonomous region during the plebiscite. While its powers were
more substantial than the Marcosian Regions 9 and 12, RA 6734's legitimacy was questioned by the MNLF since the ARMM was established without their concurrence.

Relevant development plans formulated during this period included the Regional Development Strategy for Central Mindanao (1987-1992), under the helm of RDC Chairman Zacaria Candao, who was the 2nd governor of Maguindanao during the 1970s and later became the 1st ARMM governor. Despite the experience of the last 20 years, one may note that the RDS does not mention conflict as a development challenge; instead, a purely economic lens is used.

In case of Maguindanao, an integrated area development (IAD) approach is proposed to leverage the existing infrastructure of Polloc port and Cotabato City and the aquatic resources of Illana Bay to hasten development. Illana Bay for fishing. The RDS-CM also proposes the use of a computer-assisted land use information system (LUIS) to support IAD. The resulting clusters and strategies per the 1987-1992 RDS are as follows:

Table 2. Proposed Maguindanao IAD clusters (RDS-CM 1987-1992)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The rolling hills of Buldon, Barira, Parang, Matanog, Dinaig and Upi</td>
<td>Tree farming and plantation crops. HVCs for cool, upland areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plain areas- Maganoy, Ampatuan, SSB, Datu Piang and Dinaig</td>
<td>Rice cultivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshy areas - Pagalungan and Datu Paglas, Buluan Lake, areas along Rio Grande river</td>
<td>duck raising, organized fishing. Flood control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal - Parang, Dinaig and Upi</td>
<td>marine fishing, processing of tuna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upi, Datu Piang, Buluan, Dinaig</td>
<td>cottage industries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province-wide</td>
<td>Education and Training institutions for scientific and technological manpower</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While IAD has been a popular planning concept for Mindanao since the establishment of the National Council on Integrated Area Development (NACIA) in 1978, its successful implementation has been limited. Links between regional planning and local development planning in many places, particularly in war-torn Central Mindanao, are shaky. Similarly, while the Updated Regional Development Plan of Central Mindanao 1990-1992 (NEDA 1990) discusses the need to restore ecological balance through reforestation and stoppage of logging operations, and strengthen the spatial dimension of planning, there is no mention of conflict or governance-related requirements. This was instead left to the political track as well as civil-military initiatives such as the 1989 Kaliintad (Peace) program, a propaganda and mobilization warfare program of the AFP.

It was only during the brief three-year term of Linginding Pangandaman, the 2nd ARMM Governor, that a Master Plan defining the parameters of the ARMM Economic Development Plan was adopted, although those were separate from initiatives to complement national peace efforts and address the issue of stability. For the first 5 years of its existence, from 1990 to 1995, the ARMM received infusions of seed money* for infrastructure projects. fixed at P615 million per year. It reached a total of P3.075 billion, with the national subsidy
converted into pork barrel as Candao subdivided disbursements into district, provincial and regional impact projects. When Nur Misuari came onboard as ARMM Governor in 1996, there was 350 million in seed money left over from previous administration.

A key development during this period was the proposal to create a Mindanao Economic Development Authority (MEDA), spearheaded in 1991 by Vicente Paterno. This aimed to address the situation where development plans were formulated across the five administrative regions of Mindanao that connected them separately to Manila and Cebu, but there was no inter-regional, island-wide plan. Despite passing in both houses, the proposed MEDA bill was vetoed by President Aquino in March 1992, purportedly due to resistance from NEDA. In 1992, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order 512 creating the Mindanao Economic Development Council (MEDCo). While a largely coordinative body, the following administration under Fidel Ramos would strengthen MEDCo by ensuring that the Presidential Adviser for Mindanao was also concurrently MEDCo Chairman. MEDCo was abolished in 2010 with the passage of RA 9996 creating the Mindanao Development Authority (MinDA). Despite allegations of inefficiency and corruption, SPDA remained in effect, and was retained as part of the boards of both MEDCo and MinDA.

The fall of the Marcos dictatorship paved the way for a multitude of grassroots peace-building initiatives and organizations to bloom. The 1992 National Unification Commission consultations and the subsequent "Six Paths to Peace” agenda enshrined in EO No. 3 ensured that peace education and other "peace-lens" tools were introduced in a number of academic and development institutions and processes. (LGSP 2003, Castro, Galace & Lesaca (2005). Conflict analysis and the Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) methodology were also introduced in the mid- to late-90s, particularly by international non-government organizations engaged in the area.

Table 3 below summarizes an array of Conflict-Sensitive and Peace-Promoting diagnostic tools developed by various development actors, and variably used for Philippine projects in recent years.

Table 3. Conflict-Sensitive and Peace Promoting Diagnostic Tools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Org, Tool</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CARE Benefits-Harm Handbook</td>
<td>Assessment and framework for monitoring of impacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA Do No Harm</td>
<td>Micro-conflict analysis, project planning and programming, IA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA-CPR Conflict Diagnostic Handbook</td>
<td>Design of a conflict diagnostic framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clingendael Inst. Conflict and Policy Assessment Handbook</td>
<td>Conflict analysis with a view to developing prevention policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID Strategic Conflict Assessment</td>
<td>Conflict analysis and planning of programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC EC Checklist for Root Causes of conflict</td>
<td>Awareness raising, early warning and proactive agenda-setting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Peace particularly in Mindanao was a cornerstone of former AFP Chief-of-Staff and Defense Secretary Fidel V. Ramos's agenda. Upon assuming office in July 1992, "national reconciliation" was declared as one of the Ramos Administration's highest priorities. This led to the creation of the National Unification Commission (NUC), which was given six months to conduct extensive and participatory consultations to produce strategies for engaging in peace talks with all armed groups.

The findings of the NUC state five root causes of Philippine armed conflict: a. Poverty and economic iniquity, b. Poor governance, c. Injustice and human rights violations, d. Structural issues, e. siphoning off local wealth to capital, all of which are further degraded by the marginalization of indigenous cultural communities. In the words of former NPA defector Victor Corpuz, "Insurgency is a tree whose taproot is maldistribution of fruits of the land because of the concentration of wealth in the hands of the few." The NUC consultations were groundbreaking as the first government process that recognized poverty and inequality as the primary causes of conflict. A major contribution of the NUC is the 'Six Paths to Peace', which must be pursued simultaneously if a "just and lasting peace" is to be achieved. (Coronel-Ferrer 2002). The six paths are as follows:

1. Pursuit of social, economic, and political reforms aimed at addressing the root causes of armed struggle and social unrest.
2. Consensus building and empowerment for peace through continuous consultation at the national and local levels.
3. Peace negotiations with armed groups
4. Implementing measures for reconciliation, reintegration of former combatants and
rehabilitation of those affected by the conflict.
5. Conflict management and protection of civilians
6. Initiatives to build, nurture and enhance a positive climate for peace.

The Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) was created to assume the advisory and coordination functions of the NUC, whose official term ended in June 1993. While the first Organic Act of the ARMM, RA 6734, was ratified as early as 1989, it was only during the Ramos administration that the 1996 Final Peace Agreement (FPA) with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was signed. The 1996 FPA provided for the strengthening and expansion of the ARMM as well as the establishment of transitory bodies such as the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) and the Consultative Assembly (CA), and the proclamation of provinces and cities under the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) which were meant as opportunities for the MNLF to take active part in public management as an intrinsic part of self-governance. During the ARMM turnover ceremony from Pangandaman to Misuari in September 1996, President Ramos crowed that "although the ARMM has been in existence since 1990, only now we can say that it is accepted by all of its constituents".

Between 1996-2000, the Government of the Philippines poured in substantial amounts of funds to support the MNLF leadership in managing the ARMM, SPCPD and SZOPAD, with combined national government investments at an approximate PhP 67.88 billion. Official Development Assistance (ODA) also infused substantial support for the ARMM and SZOPAD, reaching PHP 41.116 billion as of 2004. (OPAPP 2011) A ceasefire agreement was also reached with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in 1997.

However, from 1994-2000, the ARMM posted highest poverty incidence across all regions in the Philippines, mildly improving in 2003 when it ranked second only to CARAGA. It is even more interesting to note that in 1991, only 56% of the ARMM population was considered poor, whereas the initial period following the signing of the FPA saw poverty incidence in the ARMM increase by 47%. (PSA-NSCB 2011) This increased from 45.4%, or a magnitude of 1.37 million citizens in 2003 to 55.3% or 1.77 million citizens by 2006. (ARMM RDP Midterm Update 2013-2016)

Abubakar's (2000) exhaustive assessment of SPCPD and SZOPAD runs down the various factors to which the failure of development in the ARMM is attributed. This includes assessments that the SPCDP was, by law, merely a coordinative/monitoring body, and therefore a "toothless development agency" rendered "wingless" by not being capacitated to implement. Other commentaries posited that post-1996 FPA development efforts had insufficient funding support from National Government. Funds from national government were mere attributions, they said, with line agencies hesitant to program funds directly for use by the SPCPD and the ARMM Regional Government. Others said that government was not ready to implement what it had signed in 1996, and was only able to mobilize implementation funds nearly two years later.

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4 Areas under SZOPAD include Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, North Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato, Sarangani and Palawan, including the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Zamboanga, Puerto Princesa and Kidapawan.
The gap was filled by an influx of support from the international donor community. However, it took six months after the 1996 signing for NEDA, UNDP and SPCPD to meet with MNLF leaders on possible socio-economic packages. Confidence building measures started in April 1997, as the first-ever humanitarian assistance for former rebels. A trust fund was created to implement the GOP-UN Multi-Donor Program, with resources from Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, Sweden. The UN-MDP would be implemented in four waves, the last of which was the Act4Peace program, which used key MNLF community leaders as "peace and development advocates" (PDAs) in MNLF-influenced "peace and development communities" (PDCs). The World Bank and Japan-facilitated SZOPAD Social Fund was created in 1997, but its first project would only be started in October 1998, with a two-year delay.

Criticisms of international organizations from both development workers and MNLF cadres themselves claim that the resources pooled in such mechanisms largely went to stipends for foreign consultants, and did not directly translate into improved standards of living for beneficiary communities. The UN raised a total of USD 9.8 million, a hefty chunk of which went to overhead expenses. As of June 30, 1999, 43 percent of actual expenses had gone to admin support, 28 percent to technical assistance, 23 percent to direct support, and 6 percent to training. (Gardiola 2005, Danguilan-Gloria and Vitug 2000.)

Another factor that was not foreseen was the impact of the Asian Financial Crisis. Former UNDP adviser Paul Oquist (2009) notes:

Prior to the assumption to the ARMM administration by the MNLF in 1996, the organization received a P500 million per year special investment budget. That five-year extraordinary budget was scheduled to expire by law, and its non-renewal coincided with the advent of the financial crisis. The net result, however, is that ARMM had more investment resources during the armed conflict than during the peace and reconstruction process.

What many assert is that there were enough resources poured into the ARMM, but were mismanaged, or worse, stolen. Institutions created for regional development, including SPCPD, SPDA, and the ARMM Regional Planning and Development Office (RPDO) suffered from accusations of incompetence and corruption. The end of Misuari's three-year term in 1999 led to his ouster not only as ARMM Governor and SPCPD Chairman but also as MNLF Chairman, with the Council of 15 declaring Misuari 'incompetent', and effectively replacing the MNLF Central Committee. Despite thoroughness of the NUC platforms and the best intentions, efforts under the Ramos administration would fall short. Gloria and Vitug (2000) remarked:

Concession was the key word. Government policy thus revolved around the concept of accommodation and co-optation--a strategy long employed on the Muslims by colonizers, and subsequently, by the latter's local subalterns. Peace always had a price in Mindanao, and policymakers and politicians had always believed that this price was something quantifiable. Ramos, for instance, acknowledged early on the government's principal concern in the negotiations with the MNLF: how to accommodate guerrillas in government. The framework habits flaws, given the complexity not only of the problems in Mindanao but the entire bureaucracy itself.

Another serious limitation is the fact that implementation extended beyond the limits of his
six-year term. The following administration under Estrada would soon dismantle much of the gains from the Ramos period.


The transition to the Estrada Administration in 1998 saw a radical change with regards to the peace process. Many previous commitments regarding development in Mindanao were overruled or were not continued.

For a brief period, Mindanao went back to its segregated status of pre-1991. In order to accommodate political patrons, three Presidential Assistants/Advisers were appointed for Southern, Eastern and Western Mindanao, substantially weakening the powers of the MEDCo chairman.

Estrada, a former action star, also oversaw the creation of the National Peace and Development Plan (NPDP), whose salient features included: 1) an overall effort along two tracks described in counterinsurgency terminology as the "Left Hand of Friendship" and the "Right Hand of Force"; 2) a "Grand Strategy" known as the "Total Approach "to socio-cultural, economic, political and military dimensions of the insurgency, and the 3) "Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Develop" (CHCD) methodology used by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to consolidate the gains of counterinsurgency operations with development projects. A Presidential Task Force for Relief and Rehabilitation of Central Mindanao was also created through EO 267 to coordinate the delivery of basic services to conflict-affected areas in mainland Mindanao (Office of the President, 2000).

In spite of the ongoing negotiation process with the MILF, Estrada’ policies and the non-continuance of previous commitments led to the 2000 declaration of "all-out war" against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, which resulted in the record high displacement of around 900,000 individuals in Mindanao. (World Bank 2005, Minland 2008, ICG 2008, IDMC 2009)

A typical plan created during this period was a 2000 Strategic Action Plan for the Immediate Relief and Short-term Rehabilitation of the Conflict-Affected Areas in Mindanao by the Mindanao Coordinating Council (MCC), a special interagency body created by Estrada through EO No. 261 which acknowledged that "Mindanao has been the subject of development efforts which have so far been unsuccessful", "there has been uneven development in Mindanao, especially in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao", and "there is a need to synchronize, integrate, and accelerate the efforts of the various sectors, including the existing bodies and agencies created to promote the development of Mindanao, to ensure the efficient utilization of resources and effectiveness of plans, programs and projects".

The MCC SAP noted that due to the All-Out War with the MILF and lawless elements in Region IX, at least 488 barangays in 85 municipalities within 18 provinces were badly hit. Particular

5 For more information, see varying issuances from the National Security Council (2001), the office of the National Security Advisor (2000) on the Estrada Administration's stance on addressing the MILF.
areas of focus were Matanog and Barira in Maguindanao, the former site of Camp Abubakar, with some spillover effects in Kapatagan and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur. Other hotspots were the marshy areas of Pagalungan and Pagagawan, which had a large concentration of MILF fighters, as well as the surrounding area of Lake Buluan.

ARROYO ADMINISTRATION (2001-2010)

Following the impeachment of Estrada in 2001, President Arroyo reversed the policy of her predecessor and declared an "all-out-peace" stance towards the MILF. This led to the signing of an Agreement on Peace between the GPH and the MILF in June 2001 in Tripoli, Libya. This covered three aspects: security, rehabilitation, and ancestral domain. Particularly relevant to this study is the section on rehabilitation, which committed both Parties to the return of internally-displaced persons, and principle B2, which states that "The MILF shall determine, lead, and manage rehabilitation and development projects in conflict-affected areas, except when public funds are involved, in which case Government procedures and rules shall be observed."

As a result of the humanitarian, rehabilitation, and development aspects of the 2001 Tripoli Agreement, the MILF created the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) as its development arm. With medical professionals as the majority of its founders (triggering the moniker "Bangsamoro Doctors Agency") it was only in 2006 when BDA was able to begin its first community-driven development (CDD) program in a pilot of six villages under the World Bank-administered Mindanao Trust Fund (MTF).

RA 9054 was also passed into law in 2001. This strengthened the ARMM Organic Act and expanded the ARMM through plebiscite. This time, the Islamic City of Marawi and the province of Basilan (excluding Isabela City) opted to join the region.

This period was also characterized by a spate of local government development initiatives. The 2000 all-out-war led to the creation in 2001 of the Iranun Development Council (IDC), an alliance formed by the local governments of Buldon, Matanog, and Barira. From 2003 onwards, national government and donor support was usually framed through the integrated area development (IAD) model, using the KALAHI (Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan, or "arm-in-arm against poverty") convergence approach. This was joined by Parang in 2008 and Datu Blah Sinsuat in 2010; however the IDC was largely discontinued in the post-Arroyo era.

Other IAD initiatives included that of the Philippines-Canada Local Government Support Program in ARMM (LGSPA), which began in 1992 but only took off in 1995 after a re-orientation towards strengthening regional participation in BIMP-EAGA. Part of LGSPA's program objectives was to support selected LGUs to do IAD through local government alliances and multi-sectoral participation. The resulting IAD clusters included:

- Todo-Unlad Cluster Area for Sustainable Development (TUCLAS), an offshoot of the Liguwasan Marsh Development Alliance (LMDA), TUCLAS focused on six municipalities surrounding Liguwasan Marsh and Buluan Lake, who suffered from the shift from riverine transportation to land transportation.

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6 Agreement on Peace between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. 22 June 2001. Tripoli, Libya. Also included as part of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro, signed March 25, 2014.
• Illana Bay Regional Alliance (IBRA), later called the Illana Bay Management Council. This covered five municipalities in Maguindanao and LDS, particularly Sultan Kudarat, Upi, and Datu Odin Sinsuat in Maguindanao, and Balabagan and Kapatagan in Lanao del Sur.
• Lake Lanao Area Management Alliance (LLAMA)
• Metro Jolo Integrated Development Alliance (MJIDA)
• Tawi-Tawi Alliance of Local Authorities (TALA)

These initiatives were also complemented by the AFP's civil-military operations (CMO) programs, such as the 2000 ISLA (I Sincerely Love All Muslims), a reconciliation program in Lanao del Norte run by the 4ID and conceptualized by an ecumenical group from Luzon; and the 2002 SALAAM (Special Advocacy on Literacy/Livelihood and Advancement of Muslims), which used engagements with traditional and religious leaders to implement education programs for illiterate adults and out-of-school youth. However, these programs had limited traction due to their counterinsurgency bent. These were parallel to the Arroyo administration's initiatives for areas influenced by the Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army/National Democratic Front (CPP/NPA/NDF), particularly the KBP (Kalayaan Barangay Program / KALAHI para sa Kalayaan / "Freedom Communities"), which was established from 2005-2009 to provide PHP 3 to 5 million worth of infrastructure projects in identified barangays vulnerable to conflict.

Initial negotiations between GPH and the MILF broke down when the government unilaterally attacked MILF positions in 2003, resulting in the displacement of around 452,258 people during the Buliok offensive. The signing of a ceasefire agreement with the MILF later that year paved the way for resumed negotiations. The SPDA, created during the Marcos regime, was deactivated in 2002 and placed under a task force to undergo organizational enhancements in 2003. But President Arroyo, though Executive Order No. 560, reactivated the agency in August 29, 2006 as implementing arm for the economic catch-up plan on the implementation of the 1996 GPH-MNLF Peace Agreement, under OPAPP oversight. It was only in 2014, under Benigno Simeon Aquino's administration, that SPDA was abolished as a non-functioning GOCC.

Innovations with regard to peace and development under the Arroyo Administration included the signing of EO 569, which designated the Regional KALAHI Convergence Groups as regional peace process mechanisms, and the regional Presidential Assistants as regional peace advisers. However, this was not fully implemented. While efforts were made towards localizing peace and development efforts, weak links between national, regional, and provincial plans, as well as lack of capacity, made implementation difficult. The ARMM MTRDP for 2014-2010 described Maguindanao as "a showcase of diversified agriculture", but cited peace and order issues as hindrances to development. The need for full implementation of the 1996 GPH-MNLF FPA and forging of a GPH-MILF pact aside, the MTRDP focused largely on horizontal conflict issues: weak criminal justice system, loose firearms, drugs, and family feuds. Possible solutions cited--but largely unimplemented--included mediation and reconciliation through customs (izma) and tradition (taritib), the use of blood money, and strengthening of peace-building institutions such as the Regional Reconciliation and Unification Commission (RRUC) and the Regional and Provincial Peace and Order Councils (RPOC/PPOC) to promote peace and order in the region.

Official Development Assistance (ODA)-funded initiatives sought to fill the gap. As noted by Gardiola 2005, it is very difficult to determine the total amount of ODA that has gone to the
ARMM due to highly fragmented funding, implementation, and monitoring systems across areas and stakeholders. Adriano and Parks 2009 note how many of these aid programs tend towards fragmentation and duplication, having similar objectives but entirely different donor requirements and procedures, plagued by competition, poor coordination, and weak linkages between program inputs and targeted peace-building outcomes.

Table 4 shows a summary of the major donor-funded peace-related programs in conflict-affected areas, from the 1996 FPA to the present.

In parallel to heavy ODA spending estimated to average about USD 40 million per year (OECD data cited by Adriano and Parks 2009), the Philippine Government also pursued pursued efforts toward mainstreaming "conflict-sensitive and peace-promoting" local development planning,

After the release of the DILG's Rationalized Planning System (RPS) in 2005, two initiatives attempted to mainstream the "conflict-sensitive and peace-promoting" framework into local government planning and programming: a manual on the local planning process for the ARMM formulated by the CIDA-funded Local Governance Support Program in ARMM (LGSPA), and a handbook on CSPP written by OPAPP with support from UNDP.

The LGSPA handbook recommended the following innovations for drafting CDP-ELAs in the ARMM:

1. A sector on "Culture and Peace" should be added to the traditional five development sectors recommended by DILG in the RPS, in due recognition to the role of the sector in ARMM. Sub-sectors under "Culture and Peace" include arts, cultural heritage, sports and recreation, public order, and human security.
2. Local development planners must be capacitated to undergo conflict analysis, which would plot the history of the conflict and identify the drivers and stakeholders affected, as well as any peace-building opportunities and initiatives currently ongoing.
3. CSPP planning would be a multi-stakeholder effort that must include not only the local government but also the military, traditional leaders, or non-state actors such as the MNLF or MILF as relevant.
4. The PCIA Tool can be used to re-design or remove projects in the list that potentially contribute to conflict in the community and prioritize those that promote peace. The tool identifies five impact areas that LGUs should closely look into: conflict management capacities; militarization/armed conflict and human security; Political structure and processes; Economic structure and processes; and Social empowerment.
5. LGUs should also be capacitated to build a database for peace planning, using for indicators from CBMS, LGPMS and related human security Indicators
6. Implementation of CSPP initiatives should empower the municipal and Barangay Peace and Order Committees (MPOC/BPOC), which are mandated for the purpose.

However, the peace processes were seriously undermined by growing political unrest against the Arroyo Administration. Amidst accusations of corruption, electoral fraud, and heightened extrajudicial killings of activists, the aborted Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) in 2008 led to another major outbreak of armed violence in Central Mindanao between selected MILF forces and the government, as well as the displacement of approximately 700,000 people. This deadly cycle of poverty, armed conflict and displacement in the Bangsamoro areas was made even deadlier by reinforced corruption, patronage politics and a pervasive culture of impunity in the ARMM Regional Government,
coming to a head with the infamous 2009 Ampatuan Massacre.

At least 57 people were killed in the convoy intending to file then-Buluan vice mayor Esmael Mangudadatu's Certificate of Candidacy for the 2010 gubernatorial elections against Datu Umsay Mayor Andal Ampatuan, Jr., son of then-incumbent Maguindanao governor Andal Ampatuan, Sr. and brother of then-ARMM Regional Governor Zaldy Ampatuan. The latter is implicated in the Hello Garci scandal as having aided former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in electoral fraud during the 2005 elections, and is currently facing graft charges filed by the DILG for at least PHP 2.559 billion worth of misallocated funds. As remarked by President Benigno Simeon Aquino III during the October 2012 announcement of the GPH-MILF Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB), "the ARMM is a failed experiment. Many of the people continue to feel alienated by the system, and those who feel that there is no way out will continue to articulate their grievances through the barrel of a gun." With the new Bangsamoro entity on the horizon, this now begs the question: how might national, local and international actors learn from the gains and pitfalls of this so-called "failed experiment"?

AQUINO ADMINISTRATION (2011-2016)

A civilian-led peace process was established as a cornerstone of Aquino's policy even prior to the 2010 elections. His electoral platform, the 2009 "Social Contract with the Filipino People" swore a transformation "...from a disjointed, short-sighted Mindanao policy that merely reacts to events and incidents...to one that seeks a broadly-supported just peace and will redress decades of neglect of the Moro and other peoples in Mindanao." A crucial aspect of Aquino's peace policy, which is also articulated in the AFP's Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) Bayanihan, is the recognition that insurgency is largely driven by structural problems in Philippine society and so the issue of peace and conflict cannot be addressed through military means alone.

Thus, part of the instructions issued by Aquino to the peace negotiators--coming from civil society and the academe, and not the military as in years past--upon his assumption was that all negotiations would build on the experience and lessons learned from the past, including the botched implementation of the MNLF FPA and MOA-AD. As such, commitments to be made and agreed on should be inclusive and transparent, and would hinge upon the Philippine government's ability to deliver--politically, economically, and socially--within its term and within the bounds and flexibilities of the 1987 Constitution. (PDP 2011-2016, Chapter 9) Similarly, it was only during the Aquino Administration that earlier attempts for full CSPP began to gain traction. The first time that national government funds would outstrip donor investments. Combined with ARMM TISP and Sajahatra Bangsamoro funds, PAMANA special infusions to the ARMM for the years 2011 to 2013 alone would reach almost PHP 15 billion.

Payapa at Masaganang Pamayanan (PAMANA)

The Philippine Development Plan (2011-2016) therefore details two tracks for bringing all armed conflict to a permanent and peaceful closure: i) negotiated political settlement of all armed conflicts; and (ii) a complementary track for addressing the root causes of armed conflict, primarily through the Payapa at Masaganang Pamayanan (PAMANA) Program. True to the Filipino predilection for acronyms, PAMANA stands for "Peaceful and Resilient Communities", or "Legacy". After some starts and stops, it launched in 2011 as Government's umbrella program and framework "to respond and strengthen peace building, reconstruction and development in conflict-affected areas (CAAs)". The program was designed to deliver geographically-tailored interventions for each of the five (5) peace tables: the main
negotiations with the CPP/NPA/NDF and the MILF, as well as the closure of commitments with the CPLA, RPMP/RPA/ABB, and the MNLF. Initial operations began using funds from the discontinued KBP program, while subsequent budget cover was locked in as a special line item in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) from 2012 onwards. As of 2014, PAMANA implementation is coursed through over ten national line agencies and the regional agencies of the ARMM. Oversight still remains with OPAPP.

PAMANA is notable as the first civilian government initiative of this magnitude specifically for development in conflict-affected areas in the Philippines, as previous programs were either largely donor-driven, relied on attributions from existing agency budgets, or were implemented by the Department of Defense, as in the case of KBP and its oversight body, the National Development Support Command (NADESCOM), which was deactivated in 2012 amidst rumors of inefficiency and corruption. (Gloria et al 2011)

Conceptually, PAMANA was meant to "close the gap between events at the negotiating table and realities on the ground", but experienced early challenges in defining a coherent strategy and theory of change. The official conceptual framework for PAMANA from mid-2011 onwards takes off from the recommendations of the World Bank's 2011 World Development Report, which states that interventions to address conflict must mitigate the particular security, justice and economic stressors (i.e. poverty, lack of basic services, crime, land tenurial issues) that drive insurgency in a given community, as well as strengthen institutions to better respond to said needs. As such, it has been recommended that legitimate institutions must be strengthened in order to allow them to provide citizen security, justice and jobs, and address grievances that drive conflict.

This is operationalized across at least three (3) discrete components--policy level interventions ("Pillar 1"), community-driven development ("Pillar 2"), and sub-regional infrastructure and livelihood support ("Pillar 3"). All interventions use existing staff complements and program mechanisms of regular government programs, but with additional inputs for "conflict-sensitive" targeting, process implementation and prioritization. Specifically, it claims that security, justice and jobs-related interventions must collectively contribute to the building of "social cohesion", or what is defined as the "norms, values, and social relations that bond communities together, as well as form bridges between communal groups and the state" (Colletta and Cullen 2000) or, as used in project documents describing PAMANA's CDD components, "the building of trust of communities in government and in each other". In the ARMM, these were supplemented with specialized programs for MNLF communities such as the "Peace and Development Communities (PDC-PAMANA)", building on the earlier Act4Peace PDCs.

At least 40% of PAMANA interventions are devoted to infrastructure and livelihood projects programmed and implemented through provincial governments, first with oversight of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), and later through the ARMM's varying line agencies. Mainstreaming Peace and Development in Local Governance Project (MPDLGP) workshops were implemented by OPAPP and DILG with support from the Spanish Government, which led provincial government representatives to select PAMANA Pillar 3 projects through an analysis of conflict drivers in the area. The objectives of MPDLGP are stated as follows:

• Develop the internal capacity of LGUs to harmonize peace and development as major pillars for good governance;
• Strengthen LGU capacity to formulate plans and budget, and implement programs and projects using peace and development as major lenses;
• Organize a pool of local governance champions that will advocate peace and development in local governance;
• Promote the use of peace and development as major consideration for the Seal for Good Housekeeping and the Performance Challenge Fund;
• Enhance competencies of LGUs to monitor program implementation using Peace and Conflict Sensitive Monitoring and Evaluation system; and
• Develop a mechanism within the Department to ensure mainstreaming of peace and development in governance.

Much of the toolkit used by MPDLGP takes off from the processes recommended by the 2009 OPAPP and LGSPA guidebooks, but were updated to conform with the 2011 WDR security-justice-jobs theory of change. A particular addition was the use of Systems Approach Conflict Analysis (SACA), which led the participants through a process of identifying key incidents of conflict that directly affect the community, identifying key Security, Economic Opportunities/Jobs and Justice Issues and formulating programs that can help mitigate the effects of these stressors while strengthening local government institutions. (OPAPP 2012)

That said, no clear site selection or economic feasibility elements are included in early PAMANA Pillar 3, prior to the 2013 release of a OPAPP-DILG Joint Memorandum Circular providing supplemental guidelines on the management of the PAMANA-DILG fund. This has led some to speculate that PAMANA's Pillar 3 component (not to mention TISP) may be susceptible to political pressures (ex. divide by n mayors), or otherwise has acted as a "carrot" to cajole the ARMM governors in supporting the peace negotiations and ARMM institutional reform. Remaining design questions include the extent (or lack) of strategic linkages and cohesion between interventions, which may be seen as an inherent problem of the Philippine planning system, where fragmentation driven by varying targeting systems and budget lines across different agencies is the norm rather the exception.

In a given municipality, this would include the so-called "Pillar 2" community-driven development interventions (building off from the mechanisms of the ARMM social fund) and "Pillar 1" programs, alongside a limited number of targeted beneficiaries of the GPH-MILF Sajahatra Bangsamoro program. Pillar 2 refers to community-driven development / community-driven reconstruction (CDD/CDR) schemes, where block grants are made available for communities to directly participate in the selection and delivery of priority community livelihood and infrastructure interventions. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the signing of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro led to the creation of the Sajahatra Bangsamoro program, which was originally meant to be a quick-gestating, six-to-nine-month "confidence-building program" covering health, education, and limited livelihood interventions, but whose implementation has stretched to more than two years.

Pillar 1 is particularly of interest, as the language of the PDP's Chapter on Peace and Security commits the Aquino Administration to interventions such as "dialogue and policy formulation to improve governance and address threats to identity and marginalization" and "ancestral domain, agrarian reform and natural resource conflict resolution." The first manifestation of Pillar 1 in the ARMM was through a shelter assistance project for internally-displaced persons (IDPs) from the 2008 outbreak of hostilities from MOA-AD. This partially fulfills the PDP's commitment to address the needs of bakwit (evacuees/IDPs), although Peace Process Advisor Sec. Deles has clarified during at least one public presentation that core shelters are
community-based infrastructure and therefore more geared as Pillar 2 rather than as a policy intervention.

Major strides have also been made in ensuring women's participation at all levels of the peace process, along with a program to integrate programs addressing gender and conflict issues in ARMM provincial development plans, through the Localization of the Philippine National Action Plan (NAP) on UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security Social protection packages for MNLF were also included in programming from 2013 onwards and remain to be an integral component of Sajahatra--a trend likely to continue in the post-agreement landscape. Some argue that the signing of the peace agreement is the largest Pillar 1 achievement, but much work remains to be done on root causes of conflict such as ancestral domain, agrarian reform and natural resource conflict--responsibilities that now shift to the prospective Bangsamoro Government.

PAMANA also includes special programs for MNLF-affiliated communities and former combatants. An intrinsic challenge for such "peace-building" programs is the calibrated targeting of interventions for various non-state armed groups and their factions upon factions. Sajahatra beneficiaries are specifically selected by the MILF, with no other selection criteria. TISP and PDC-PAMANA had a strong MNLF bent in line with the GPH-MNLF-Organization of Islamic Conference Tripartite Implementation Review of the 1996 FPA, which was supported by the presence of ex-MNLF leader Bainon Karon in the appointee ARMM Regional Government. In the aftermath of the 2013 Zamboanga Siege, where MNLF-Misuari faction troops led by Uztads Habier Malik harried Zamboanga City, anecdotal reports allege that certain commanders who chose not to join the MNLF-Misuari group were beneficiaries of PAMANA programs.

With the signing of the FAB and the CAB surfaces the question of normalization, which includes disarmament of other armed groups and not just the MILF's Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces. While limited data is available, PAMANA-ARMM from 2013 onwards includes a window called Camps to Communities or Community Security Management (C2C/CSM), where targeted MNLF communities are provided development interventions in parallel to unspecified security-related arrangements, possibly similar to the old "Arms to Farms" and Balik-BARIL (Bring a Rifle, Improve Your Livelihood] or arms-for-livelihood buyback schemes. (OPAPP 2013b). No clear report exists on its outputs or impact.

**ARMM Transition Investment Support Plan (TISP)**

The long process of reforming the ARMM was launched through an initiative to postpone the August 8, 2011 elections in order to synchronize it with the regular national and local elections set for May 13, 2013. Historically, no regular ARMM elections had ever been held as they had been subject to resetting by legislation since the region's creation in 1989, making the ARMM susceptible to various forms of electoral mischief. This was also seen as a means of creating a positive atmosphere for the then-ongoing peace talks between the GPH and the MILF--as evidenced by a no-objection letter transmitted in February 2011 by MILF Chairperson Al-Haj Murad Ebrahim to Cotabato City Congressperson Bai Sandra Sema, who sponsored the bill at the level of the House of Representatives.

Republic Act No. 10153 was enacted in to law on June 30, 2011, setting the ARMM elections to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three years thereafter. RA 10153 also authorized the President to appoint an interim caretaker government that would hold office from 30 September 2011 until 30 June 2013 when the officials elected in the May 2013
elections would have assumed office. TISP was thus formulated as the socio-economic component of the ARMM Roadmap for Reform (informally called the "ARMM Mini-Marshall Plan") to be undertaken by the 21-month Aquino-appointed leadership, led by OIC Regional Governor Mujiv Hataman and Vice-Regional Governor (and MNLF leader) Hadja Bainon Karon. (ARMM 2011) Under the auspices of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), PHP 8.592 Billion was initially programmed for various programs and projects through 11 agencies, on top of the regular national support to ARMM, which amounted to P11.7 billion for 2012. While it was meant to be completed by June 2013 in time for the assumption to office of the new elective officials of ARMM, implementation of some projects are still ongoing, and have been suspended in due to the 2014 Supreme Court ruling on the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), from which TISP funds were sourced.

Sajahatra Bangsamoro

The signing of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) in October 2012 led to increased expectations for positive transformation in the ARMM. Sajahatra Bangsamoro (roughly translated to "blessings, prosperity and peace' in/of the Bangsamoro" or "Peace Bangsamoro") was thus launched in February 2013 as Pres. Benigno Aquino III's "concrete, socio-economic peace initiative that signifies the partnership of the GPH and the MILF in working towards peace and development for Bangsamoro and the country." (OPAPP 2013a)

Sajahatra aspired to deliver "quick-gestation, high-impact, social protection-type programs for beneficiaries identified by the MILF", focusing on health, education, and livelihood. While the beneficiary list has never been made public, it is reasonable to assume that much of the targeting was driven to provide initial peace dividends to the MILF’s combatants and political constituencies ahead of the formal normalization process, given that at the time, the Annexes to the FAB had not been signed. Sajahatra is notable as it was the first attempt at partnership between the GPH and MILF on socio-economic activities. Government funds were coursed through seven implementing agencies--DSWD, DOH, PhilHealth, DepEd, CHED, DA, and TESDA--organized under an interagency Task Force on Bangsamoro Development chaired by the Office of the Cabinet Secretary (OCS). These agencies and their regional offices work in tandem with a MILF-appointed Project Management Team (PMT), funds for which were sourced from the World Bank-administered Mindanao Trust Fund (OPAPP 2013b). Sajahatra was envisioned to run for only 6-18 months, but various operational challenges ensured that implementation was still underway when the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) was signed on March 2014, more than a year after the signing of the FAB.

A general review of PAMANA, TISP and Sajahatra Bangsamoro provides a promising image of the Philippine government's sincerity and willingness to actively invest in socio-economic development for conflict areas. While many foreign-assisted programs continue to be implemented, these are largely complementary to government investments, in contrast to the scenario of previous years', where international grants or loans formed the lions' share.

Bangsamoro Development Plan

A major milestone of this period is the drafting of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)'s Bangsamoro Development Plan (BDP), which was launched at the MILF Camp Darapanan

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7 DILG retains direct operational control of the ARMM, The State of Emergency proclaimed in 2009 has not been lifted.
on November 2 and at the Philippine Development Forum in Davao City on November 5-6, 2014. Produced by the MILF's Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) after more than 12 months of technical and financial support from the World Bank, JICA, the UN and other partners, it is reportedly first economic blueprint ever produced by a non-state armed group in the world. (World Bank 2015)

The BDP aims to address various forms of injustice, which is at the heart of violent conflict in the Bangsamoro, to ensure stability and build confidence over the course of the transition. Its recommendations are focused on addressing causes of injustice at three levels: denial of the right of the Bangsamoro to form political arrangements rooted in their historical experience and attuned to their culture and identity; dispossession of their lands and with it, the suppression of their tradition and culture; and the accumulated neglect of the Bangsamoro people as shown by the very poor socio-economic indicators in the region.

While the BDP is the development plan of the MILF and not yet the Bangsamoro Government, its role is cited in the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro and the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law, which contain provisions noting the significant role of the BDP in the overall socio-economic recovery and development of the Bangsamoro Core Territory, and its interactions in the "normalization" process for combatants and conflict-affected communities.

DEVELOPMENT AND THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION: CSPP AFTER 2016?

This review of development policy in the Bangsamoro in recent years, summarized in Figure 1 below, highlight key lessons for planners and policy-makers in conflict-affected areas.

Figure 1. Peace and Development Policy (1913-present): Counter-insurgency vs Human Security
First, there has been no lack of plans or projects in the area, but many of them fell through the cracks or were approved in print but never implemented on the ground. Many of the plans that were implemented—especially those formulated in Manila for exploitative or counterinsurgency purposes—became further sources of conflict due to lack of sensitivity to nuances and power relationships on the ground.

This calls for a paradigm of development that espouses local empowerment, not patronage. With the growing acceptance that development in the Bangsamoro must respect the right to self determination, the challenge is to find strategies for decentralized development planning and implementation that is able to harmonize both modern and traditional systems and takes into account the high social and cultural diversity in these high-value natural resource areas.

In this context, Bernas’s definition of decentralization of power as "self-immolation" becomes relevant, where the functions of local government, particularly development planning, must become accountable not to central government authorities in Manila (or donor capitals abroad) but to their constituencies”. This is doubly true for autonomous and conflict-affected areas such as the ARMM/Bangsamoro and its component provinces.

While it is true that ARMM remains to be underfunded despite its vast development challenges--approximately P15,000 per capita subsidy from the national government compared to the P34,000 per capita received by Metro Manila--the experience of the 1996 GPH-MNLF Final Peace Agreement shows that mobilization of development investment is but the first step towards addressing the myriad issues involved in regional development in proposed autonomous regions. (OPAPP 2015)
This becomes more urgent in the present Bangsamoro peace process, where decommissioning of combatants creates expectations of sustained and equitable access to resources for conflict-affected communities.

Local and global experience drive home the following lessons:

1. Peace-building, decentralization and devolution are fundamentally linked, particularly in cases of sub-regional conflict. Mindanao, alongside other Asian cases such as Aceh and Southern Thailand, all exemplify struggles of a marginalized identity for meaningful participation and self-determination within a larger body politic. In contrast to these Asian examples, similar experiences from the West include the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, which led to the creation of mechanisms for the regional autonomy of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom. In Spain, nearly one tenth of the 1978 Spanish Constitution is devoted to regional matters. Of the seventeen autonomous communities in Spain (all of which have varying levels competencies, according to the principle of "asymmetrical devolution") three regions in particular, namely Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque Country, claim a "hecho diferencial" that distinguishes them from other regions. Similar to the situation in the Cordillera and Bangsamoro, these "historical nationalities" are said to own particular identities, shaped by both historical and cultural factors (including their own languages), which confer on them "a more privileged claim to autonomy than exists in other regions—and that this claim must be recognized through a qualitative difference in the nature and extent of the autonomy they enjoy." (Heywood 2000) While the Bangsamoro remains part of the Philippine Republic, presumption is the principle of subsidiarity, or an organizing principle that entails a "test of appropriateness"—or, if a governmental function can be effectively carried out by smaller or lower bodies, then it should be devolved.

2. Socio-economic development for conflict areas cannot be limited to high-level policy or micro-level community engagement, but will entail an interlocking multi-dimensional, multi-sectoral framework that addresses short-term confidence-building requirements and long-term broad developmental outcomes. This is a key lesson from the Aceh experience and conversely, a clear indicator of the Thailand peace process's current lack of traction. There have been partial attempts for such a holistic approach in the Philippines, both by the current Aquino Administration and in previous years. However, this is easier said than done, given natural limits of human and financial resources available.

3. Context analysis is key to program design, implementation and evaluation. This is highlighted in particular by the 2010 Pain and Kantor Afghanistan study, and is supported by the two final points:

4. Recognition of culture and identity is essential. Concrete process safeguards include an understanding of ethnic diversity and customary structures. As illustrated by Adriano and Parks 2010 and Habito’s 2010 study of the La Frutera banana plantation in Datu Paglas, this helps manage community conflict, minimizes marginalization, and maximize inclusion—and is not co-optation or counter-insurgency; and

5. Geography and place are key components of local structures and processes, both visible and invisible.

The discourse on peace and development in the Philippines is relatively sophisticated, if highly specialized and limited, having incorporated lessons from both local and foreign experience. (Although one might argue that foreign experience through the influence of international
Development agencies have historically more "weight" in shaping policy trends.) Leftwich's notes on the "bridge" that links thinking politically and working politically is a suitable framing in the review of recent government programs such as PAMANA, TISP and Sajahatra Bangsamoro, in that these national government programs sought to use socio-economic investments to shape and reform formal and non-formal institutions to promote positive developmental outcomes, in support of the Bangsamoro's transition from a conflict-affected area into more enduring stability in a post-agreement environment. Further, "processes are just as important as projects in development and change, and that their evolution and forms, and their institutional expression, will vary from context to context and will require both support and time to consolidate." (Leftwich 2011)

However, memories are short. As earlier sections illustrate, comprehensive and progressive policies such as those established under the Ramos Administration are easily discarded or disregarded upon change of administration. Best practices are forgotten in favor of the most current buzzwords; old sins are similarly swept under the rug.

The current administration's scope and ambition is to be commended; however, multiple technical gaps remain--gaps that, given the signing of the CAB and the transmission of the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law to Congress, are now increasingly a shared responsibility between the GPH and the MILF as it transitions to governance through the Bangsamoro Transition Authority. (Presuming that the peace process will survive the fallout post-Mamasapano, which has left the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law still pending in Congress as of this writing.)

**GAPS: SPATIALITY, INTEGRATION, ECOLOGY, CULTURE, LOCALIZATION**

The Philippine Development Plan Midterm Update (2011-2016) stresses the need for greater convergence of services across geographic and sectoral lines, supporting key value chains and strengthening area development by linking to regional, municipal and barangay-level plans--something that the future Bangsamoro government should be able to improve upon. Investment fragmentation can only be minimized if planning is conducted across a longer horizon, and not driven by the annual budget cycle. A longer and area-specific planning process that maintains rigor across design, targeting, programming, delivery and M&E components will also mitigate susceptibility to political influence, maintaining the fine line between responsiveness and merely being reactive to events.

For environmental planners, a key technical gap lies in harmonizing CSPP processes and tools with mainstream environmental planning approaches, given that conflict flashpoints in Maguindanao, and the Philippines as a whole, are often also areas rich in natural resources.

A World Bank conducted study in 2010, Behind the Veil of Conflict, was the first to analyze the economic geography of Mindanao, assessing the armed conflict in terms of spatial disparities; however, its recommendations were never explicitly picked up by policymakers.

Recent environmental initiatives for the area include the Mindanao Development Authority (MinDA)-spearheaded Mindanao River Basin Integrated Management and Development Master Plan, which conducted a detailed hydrology and basin simulation study as bases for the preparation of water resource development and flood hazard management plan; and development issues and concerns affecting the MRB and recommend appropriate development policies, strategies and program/project interventions. Resulting high impact projects have been funded under the Mind's MindaNOW (Nurturing Our Waters) program, but
the integration of tactically-peace-building related components has been limited, at best, despite its coverage of highly conflict-vulnerable areas such as the Liguwasan Marsh, and Mind’s own previous involvement in peace-building projects such as the UNDP Act4Peace. (MinDA 2012)

The most advanced current initiative that integrates both peace-building and environmental/spatial requirements is that of the German Agency for Technical Cooperation’s Conflict Sensitive Resource and Asset Management (COSERAM) program, which covers the CPP/NPA/NDF-vulnerable Caraga region. It attempts a more inclusive and integrated approach to regional development by explicitly and directly addressing conflict in the formulation of "ridge-to-reef" local-level plans at the regional down to the village level.

This is conflated with a sister GIZ project, "Sustainable Integrated Management Planning for LGUs Ecosystems" (SIMPLE), which is a collection of training tools and management instruments to help capacitate LGUs (Provinces, Municipalities and Cities) in the planning and management of LGU ecosystems in a streamlined, integrated, peaceful, and sustainable development-oriented manner. This is highly appropriate, given that inequitable access to resources drives political and social conflict in the area, given that mining and timber-rich CARAGA is second only to the ARMM in terms of poverty indicators. (GIZ 2010)

However, many of these decisions and innovations still emanate from Manila and/or various donor capitals. Apart from strengthening the spatial/environmental dimension of CSPP, there needs to be further appreciation of the cultural dimension of planning in the area. This is most important in areas such as Maguindanao, where indigenous governance and planning systems existed long before the arrival of Spain and America. This entails the empowerment of local communities to meaningfully shape their development in a manner that is environmentally sustainable and reflects local cultural practices and perspectives. This is precisely where an integrated and conflict-sensitive, agro-ecosystem-driven, and culturally-appropriate approach to development planning comes in.

With local communities’ aspirations to development that is of and not just for the Bangsamoro, the challenge is for the Bangsamoro’s technocrats to learn from the lessons of these past programs, to build on best practices, adjust from old mistakes, and build the space to make new ones.

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**IMAGE SOURCES**

### Table 4. Major Donor-funded Peace and Development Programs in the Bangsamoro

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>ODA Source</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (As of 2014)</th>
<th>Implementing Agency</th>
<th>Program Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SZOPAD Social Fund</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>1997-1999</td>
<td>USD 10 million</td>
<td>PMO, grant financing to community groups, Peoples’ Organizations (POs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Local Government Units (LGUs) to implement the development provisions of the 1996 FPA through immediate and visible assistance (“peace dividends”) by increasing livelihood opportunities and basic community-based economic and social infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMM Social Fund for Reconstruction &amp; Development Project</td>
<td>World Bank, JICA</td>
<td>2002-2014</td>
<td>USD 40.60 million+PHP 636.50 million</td>
<td>PMO-ARMM</td>
<td>Community Driven Development (CDD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mindanao Trust Fund (MTF)</td>
<td>WB, EU, AusAid, SIDA, USAID, CIDA</td>
<td>2006-2016</td>
<td>USD 23.6 million</td>
<td>BDA, CFSI, MinLand</td>
<td>Community-Driven Development (CDD) and Community-Driven Reconstruction (CDR) programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTF Reconstruction and Development Program (MTF-RDP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the Program for Local Economic Development through Enhanced Governance and Grassroots Empowerment (PLEDGE);</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(iii) operational costs for the Project Management Team of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for the Sajahatra Bangsamoro program; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program</td>
<td>ODA Source</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Amount (As of 2014)</td>
<td>Implementing Agency</td>
<td>Program Description</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mindanao Rural Development Program (MRDP)</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>2007-2012</td>
<td>P636.5 million</td>
<td>DA-National and DAF-ARMM</td>
<td>Rural infrastructure, agricultural development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrarian Reform Community Project</td>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>2009-2014</td>
<td>P1,290.00 M</td>
<td>DAR National /DAR-ARMM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoP-UN Multi-Donor Programme (Phase 1-3)</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>15 years</td>
<td>USD 60 million</td>
<td>ARMM</td>
<td>Mindanao Development Authority (MinDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act4Peace in Mindanao (Phase 4)</td>
<td>Australia, Spain, New Zealand, European Commission</td>
<td>1997-2010</td>
<td>USD 60 million</td>
<td>ARMM</td>
<td>Mindanao Development Authority (MinDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth with Equity in Mindanao (GEM)</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>17 years</td>
<td>USD 500 million</td>
<td>USAID- Louie Berger Group</td>
<td>Local economic growth, emergency livelihood assistance to some 28,000 former MNLF combatants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mindanao Peace and Development (MPAD) Program - (GEM 3, MABS, TAG)</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>USAID- Louie Berger Group</td>
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(iv) the Bangsamoro Development Plan.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>ODA Source</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (As of 2014)</th>
<th>Implementing Agency</th>
<th>Program Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan-Bangsamoro Initiative for Reconstruction and Development (J-BIRD)</td>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>2006-ongoing</td>
<td>PHP 6.6 Billion</td>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>Small-scale infrastructure, IDP/humanitarian assistance, technical assistance for government, grants to civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government Support Program in ARMM (LGSPA)</td>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>1995-</td>
<td>USD 76 million</td>
<td>LGSPA PMO</td>
<td>Technical assistance to local government, increased participation in local governance, improved service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food for Work for IDPs</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>6th Non-Project Grant Assistance of Japan Countervalue Fund (NPGA6-CVF)</td>
<td>Embassy of Japan (EOJ)</td>
<td>P170.20 M</td>
<td>2010-2011</td>
<td>EOJ</td>
<td>Equipment, Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Section 416 (B) Program FY 2002</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>PHP 213.24</td>
<td>2009-2011</td>
<td>ORG-TMS</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Basic Education Assistance</td>
<td>AusAid</td>
<td>PHP 170.16 million</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>PMO/DepEd-ARMM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program</td>
<td>ODA Source</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Amount (As of 2014)</td>
<td>Implementing Agency</td>
<td>Program Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>Basic Education Assistance for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BEAM-ARMM)</td>
<td>AusAid</td>
<td>AUD 93 million</td>
<td>2012-2017</td>
<td>DepEd-ARMM</td>
<td>Education system strengthening, building schools, teacher training, access to education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian Assistance to Agrarian Reform Community Development Support Program (IARCDSP)</td>
<td>EU/GOP</td>
<td>PHP 2.5 Billion</td>
<td>2012-2015</td>
<td>DAR</td>
<td>Assistance to Agrarian Reform Communities (ARC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mindanao Roads Improvement Project Phase I</td>
<td>Saudi Fund for Development</td>
<td>P376.0 M</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>DPWH National</td>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotabato East Diversion Road</td>
<td></td>
<td>P765.0 M</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basilan Circumferential Road (29.36 kms)</td>
<td></td>
<td>P633.0 M</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lake Lanao Circumferential Road (24.33 kms)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Mindanao Road Project (Awang-Upi-Lebak Section)</td>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>PHP 2,713 million</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>DPWH National</td>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malitubog-Maridagao (MALMAR)Irrigation Project (MMIP II) - * Pagalungan, Maguindanao in ARMM and North Cotabato in Region XII</td>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>PHP 7,000 million</td>
<td>2011-2015</td>
<td>NIA</td>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program</td>
<td>ODA Source</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Amount (As of 2014)</td>
<td>Implementing Agency</td>
<td>Program Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBRD-NRIM II</td>
<td>IBRD/WB</td>
<td>PHP 1,841.0 Million</td>
<td>2011-2013</td>
<td>DPWH National</td>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotabato City-Marawi City Road</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Digos-Cotabato City Road (Pagalungan-Cotabato Section)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Digos-Cotabato City Road (Kidapawan-Pagalungan Section)</td>
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